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HOME VIDEORECORDING AND COPYRIGHT LAW:
THE BETAMAX CASE
The copyright clause of the United States Constitution1 empowers
Congress to promote science and the arts by granting authors and inven-
tors the exclusive right to their creations for a limited time.2 Since 1790,
Congress has implemented the copyright clause with legislation.$ Copy-
right protection in the United States provides a limited monopoly over
subsequent use of a copyrighted work.4 This monopoly power extends
only to those uses that Congress has protected by legislation.5 Changing
technology has made application and effective enforcement of the copy-
right law difficult.6 The development of new techniques for reproducing
and using copyrighted works has created problems for courts in ascertain-
ing probable congressional intent regarding copyright protection. In many
such instances the drafters of the copyright law never imagined the par-
ticular context of the case at hand. The advent of the home videotape
recorder (VTR)7 represents the latest manifestation of the problem. In
1 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2 Id.
S See Agostino, Home Video: A Report on the Status, Projected Development and
Consumer Use of Videocassette Recorders and Videodisc Players in the United States,
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON PROSPECTS FOR ADDITIONAL NETWORKS at 69 (preliminary draft of
report from FCC Network Inquiry Special Staff, February 1980) [hereinafter cited as Agos-
tino]. After passing the original copyright law, Congress subsequently enacted comprehen-
sive revisions in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976. See id. See also S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 47-50 (1975); H. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-50 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
H. REP.] (reviewing history of copyright statutes).
4 See Comment, Home Videorecording: Fair Use or Infringement, 52 S. CAL. L. REv.
573, 586 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Home Videorecording].
5 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 443 (C.D.
Cal. 1979). The limited monopoly power of a copyright owner over his work stems from 17
U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. II 1979), which gives the copyright owner the exclusive right:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
6 See Comment, The Copyright Act of 1976: Home. Use of Audiovisual Recording and
Presentation Systems, 58 NE. L. REv. 467, 467 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Home Use].
7 The VTR is a device capable of off-the-air recording and playback of material broad-
cast for television reception. See note 15 infra.
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Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,8 a California fed-
eral district court recently held that non-commercial videorecording of
material broadcast free to television viewers is not an infringement of
copyright.9
The plaintiffs in the Sony case, Universal City Studios, Inc. (Univer-
sal)'0 and Walt Disney Productions, Inc. (Disney),", are producers and
copyright owners of audiovisual materials, including motion pictures. 2
Universal and Disney sell some of their works for broadcast over public
airwaves.' 3 In November, 1976, plaintiffs filed suit seeking an injunction"
to halt consumer use of the Betamax,'5 to record plaintiffs' televised,
8 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
9 Id. at 432.
" Universal, a wholly owned subsidiary of MCA, Inc., does business under its own
name as well as Universal Pictures, Universal Television, Universal 16, and United World
Films. 480 F. Supp. at 433. Universal produces motion pictures for theater and television.
Following release to threatres, Universal sometimes licenses motion pictures for television.
After exhibition on network television, Universal may license the motion picture to local
television stations in syndication and will occasionally re-release the movies to theatres. Id.
Universal also offers some motion pictures for rental to consumers, schools, and institutions.
Id.
Universal recently began marketing motion pictures to consumers on pre-recorded vide-
odiscs. Id. Universal's parent corporation, MCA, and Phillips, a Dutch electronics conglom-
erate, have jointly developed the Magna Vision videodisc system. See Schuyten, The TV:
More to View With Tapes and Disks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1980, § 3 at 11, col. 4 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Schuyten]. Videodisc systems do not have the capability to record off-the-air
and are incompatible with videotape systems such as the Betamax. Id. at 1, col. 2. By re-
moving the Betamax from competition in the newly developing home video market, MCA
would be likely to gain a greater share of the market for the company's own Magna Vision
videodisc system. See id. (noting competition between technologies for dominance in home
video marketplace); Home Use, supra note 6, at 478 n.56 (stating that many observers con-
sider Universal's participation in Sony case to be motivated by MCA/Phillips' introduction
of videodisc system into competitive home video market).
" Disney has produced theatrical motion pictures for over 50 years and has an exten-
sive library of live and animated films. 480 F. Supp. at 434. Only three of Disney's feature
length animated films have ever been licensed to television. Disney licenses many other mo-
tion pictures to television but at the date of the Sony trial had not licensed any of these
films in syndication. Id. Disney has licensed many motion pictures as network reruns. Fol-
lowing network exhibition, Disney licenses some films for rental use. Id. In 1979, Disney
began offering some theatrical motion pictures for sale on videodisc. Id. The only program-
ming currently licensed by Disney to a network is the weekly "Wonderful World of Disney."
Id.
" Id. at 432; see notes 10 & 11 supra.
' See notes 10 & 11 supra.
'" See note 146 infra (discussing details of injunction requested by plaintiffs).
"I Introduced in 1975, the Betamax was the first successfully marketed home VTR. See
Agostino, supra note 3, at 11. The fundamental technology required to record television
broadcasts has been available for over 25 years, yet high cost was a major barrier to wide-
spread VTR use. Id. at 7. Additional problems included reliability and excessive size. Id.
The Sony Betamax includes a pause button and fast-forward control similar to that of a
conventional audio recorder. The pause button allows the operator to stop whatever func-
tion in which the machine is operating. Thus, if an individual views the broadcast while
recording with Betamzx, the pause button may be used to omit undesirable segments, such
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copyrighted works."8 The complaint named as defendants the manufac-
turer, Sony Corporation, 7 and the distributor of the Betamax, Sony Cor-
poration of America (Sonam), 5 as well as an individual, William Grif-
fiths,1 9 who used his Betamax to record certain of plaintiffs' broadcast
materials for his own home use.20 Additional defendants included retail
stores which sell the Betamax21 and the advertising agency responsible for
promoting the Betamax, Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc. (DDBI).
2 2
Plaintiffs contended that home use Betamax recording directly in-
fringed their copyright2 8 and that the corporate defendants were either
direct or contributory infringers or were vicariously liable for the infringe-
as commercials, from the recording. The fast forward capability enables the playback viewer
to pass over undesired portions although the viewer must, for the most part, guess as to
when the undesired segment has passed. VTRs can record signals from an optinal video
camera. See id. at 16.
At present, at least 19 companies market VTRs with ,more market entries expected in
the near future. See id. at 41. There are currently two basic VTR tape formats-the Beta
and the VHS (Video Home System). The Beta format is a Sony development while
Masushita engineered the VHS format, which is incompatible with Beta machines. See id.
at 14. Three manufacturers, Sony, Sanyo, and Toshiba, make VTRs using the Beta format.
Two manufacturuers, Masushita and JVC, use the VHS format. Id.
By the end of 1979, 1.2 million or 1.5% of the 77 million United States television house-
holds owned VTRs. Id. at 40. Industry analysts expect that by 1984, 5.5 to 6.8 million VTRs
will be sold. Predictions indicate that VTR sales will then level off at about one million
units per year until 10-14% of United States television households own VTRs. Id. at v; 4f.
Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 577 (VTR sales will reach 75% of American house-
holds). Nevertheless, projected sales are very difficult to estimate, and VTR market success
to date has been disappointing. See Agostino, supra note 3 at 42. Experts attribute the slow
sales to high VTR cost, consumer confusion over the differing VTR formats, and fear of
obsolescence due to rapid technological advances. See, e.g., id. at 44-45; Television's Frag-
mented Future, Business Week, December 17, 1979 at 64, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Busi-
ness Week].
I6 Prior to the October, 1979 decision, the Sony court in 1977 dismissed certain counts
in the plaintiffs' complaint alleging violation of the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a) (1970). Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 429 F. Supp. 407 (C.D. Cal.
1977).
17 Sony is a Japanese corporation and manufactures the Betamax. 480 F. Supp. at 433.
Is Sonam is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sony and distributes the Betamax in the
United States. Id.
Is Girffiths is an owner and user of the Betamax. Id. Griffiths is also a client of plain-
tiffs' law firm and consented to being a defendant in the lawsuit in exchange for a waiver by
the plaintiffs of any claim for damages or costs. Id. at .437.
20 The Sony court defined home use as operation of a Betamax or other VTR in a
private home to record a program for subsequent home viewing. Id. at 442.
' Each of the retail defendants sold the Betamax and commonly made off-the-air video
recordings when demonstrating the machine to prospective customers. Id. at 439.
Z2 Since the introduction of the Betamax, DDBI, in cooperation with Sonam, created
and published Betamax advertisements for magazines, newspapers, and television. Id. at
436. Sonam agreed to indemnify DDBI for any liability arising from the advertising cam-
paign. Some of the Betamax ads invite viewers to record favorite shows or build a library,
while others suggest recording novels for television and classic movies. None of the adver-
tisements warn that recording copyrighted shows may be copyright infringement. Id.
13 Id. at 432, 443; see text accompanying notes 28-33 infra.
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ment.24 Plaintiffs also asserted that the retail stores violated copyright
law by recording portions of plaintiffs' programs to demonstrate the
Betamax to prospective purchasers.2 Universal and Disney petitioned the
court for an injunction to prohibit future copyright infringement" on the
ground that irreparable harm would result, given the economic structure
of the broadcasting industry.
27
2, 480 F. Supp. at 457; see text accompanying notes 123-45 infra. Plaintiffs also alleged
that all of the corporate defendants were liable under California law for unfair competition
and fraudulent business practices. 480 F. Supp. at 462-63. Planitiffs maintained that
Betamax diverts viewers from watching plaintiffs' shows on live television and in movie the-
aters and that Betamax advertisements unfairly misled the public into believing that off-
the-air recording of copyrighted works is legal. The Sony court reasoned that the advertise-
ments did not misrepresent any fact within the defendants' knowledge because there was no
precedent holding that home use reproduction of copyrighted works constituted infringe-
ment. Id. at 463. The court also rejected the unfair competition claim, noting that Betamax
had caused no measurable decrease in the audience for plaintiffs' works nor any loss of
profits or other damage. Id.
26 Id. at 432, 456; see text accompanying notes 115-22 infra.
26 In addition to seeking an injunction against use of the Betamax to record copy-
righted works, Universal also requested unspecified damages. See Home Videorecording,
supra note 4, at 594. Damages available to a successful plaintiff in a copyright infringement
suit include actual losses which the copyright owner has suffered and any profits which the
infringer has recovered. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979). If the plaintiff is unable to
prove the amount of actual loss or infringing profits, the court may award statutory damages
as an alternative. Statutory damages may, at-the court's discretion, range from no less than
$250 to no more than $10,000 for all infringements involved in the action. Id. § 504(c)(1). If
the copyright owner can meet the burden of proving that the infringement was willful the
court may increase the statutory award to a sum of not more than $50,000. Id. § 504(c)(2).
In addition, persons who willfully and for commercial purposes or private financial gain
infringe on copyrighted works may face criminal liability, including fines and jail sentences.
Id. § 506(a). The trial court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in
a copyright infringement suit. Id. § 505. The prospect of an award of attorneys' fees serves
as an added deterrent against infringement and discourages frivolous suits. See Home Vide-
orecording, supra note 4, at 592 n.105.
27 480 F. Supp. at 442; see notes 151-52 infra. The primary source of revenue to the
commercial television industry is advertisers, who pay to have commercials telecast. 480 F.
Supp. at 440. Network programming contains commercials, but also allows the local station
to insert advertising and keep the revenue. Id. Advertising fees are directly proportional to
the perceived rating of the program carrying the commercial. The fee for the standard
length 30 second commercial in a prime time network slot can cost from $45,000 to $125,000.
Id.
There are three major criteria for television audience measurement. The first criterion
is ratings. One rating point equals one percent of all homes owning televisions in the rele-
vant geographic market, id. at 441, and represents approximately $36 million in additional
gross revenues over the course of a season. Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1977, at 1, col. 6. Industry
analysts assume an average of two persons viewing television in each home. 480 F. Supp. at
441. The second criterion is market share. Market share is a percentage figure indicating
what percent of all homes using television at a given time is tuned to a particular network or
station. Id. The third criterion, demographics, is a measurement of audience sex, age, and
income bracket. Id.
The two major audience measuring services are Nielsen and Arbitron. At the time of
trial, the Nielsen meter services already measured videotape recording but made no measure
of playback. The Arbitron service did not measure any VTR usage. Id.
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The district court rejected each of the plaintiffs' contentions and de-
nied the injunction.2 8 The most important element of the court's holding
was that home use recording is not a violationof copyright law. 9 The
Sony court based its conclusion on statutory interpretation of both the
19090 and 197631 Copyright Acts, the legislative history of the 1976 Act,
and the doctrine of fair use.
32
Section 106(1) of the 1976 Act" gives the copyright owner, subject to
certain restrictions,3 4 the exclusive right "to reproduce derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords."35 The plain-
tiffs argued that Betamax recording violates section 106(1) since such re-
cording is a reproduction of their copyrighted works without permission. 8
The Sony court stated, however, that the 1976 Act must be read in con-
junction with the Act's legislative history to understand fully congres-
sional intent as to copyright coverage.3 7 Examining the legislative history
' 480 F. Supp. at 432-33.
:9 Id. at 442; see note 20 supra (defining home use).
O Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. Section I of the 1909 Act gave the copy-
right owner the exclusive right to "print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted
work." Id. § 1(a). The broad language of section 1 would appear to characterize Betamax
recording as copyright infringement. Courts, however, created the fair use doctrine to ex-
empt some forms of copying from the 1909 Act. See text accompanying notes 59-102 infra.
The Sony court held that home use copying is fair use as developed under the 1909 Act and
codified in the 1976 Act. 480 F. Supp. at 442.
31 Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
810 (Supp. 1I 1979)). The 1976 Act has been accused of creating as many problems as it
solves. See Home Use, supra note 6, at 470. The 1976 Act does, however, offer solutions to
many of the problems of the 1909 Act by recognizing the existence and copyrightability of
audiovisual works. Id.
32 480 F. Supp. at 442; see text accompanying notes 59-67 infra. The 1909 Act governs
recordings made prior to January 1, 1978, while recordings made after that date are subject
to the 1976 Act. Id.
- 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (Supp. 1m 1979).
U The exclusive rights granted in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979), see note 5 infra
(text of § 106), are subject to the limitations found in 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1976). The most
important of these, the fair use doctrine, is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. III 1979). See
text accompanying note 63 infra. Other exceptions to the § 106 exclusive rights include §
108 (reproduction by libraries and archives); § 109 (transfer by owner of copy or pho-
norecord); § 110 (exemption of certain performances and displays); § 111 (secondary trans-
missions of performance or display, e.g., within hotel or apartment house); § 112 ("ephem-
eral recordings"); § 113 (scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptured
works); § 114 (sound recordings); § 115 (non-dramatic musical works; compulsory license for
making and distributing phonorecords); § 116 (coin operated phonorecord players); § 117
(computers and information systems); § 118 (use of certain works in connection with non-
commercial broadcasting).
35 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (Supp. II 1979).
" 480 F. Supp. at 443; accord, Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 595 (unautho-
rized videotape reproduction of copyrighted work may violate § 106(1)).
37 480 F. Supp. at 443. The Sony court's reliance on legislative history in discerning the
scope of copyright coverage under the 1976 Act comports with Supreme Court precedent as
to statutory interpretation. See Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group Inc., 426
U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976)(error for Appeals Court to exclude reference to legislative history in
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of the 1976 Act, the court found that Congress did not intend to preclude
home use audio recording, even though no specific exemption appeared in
the statutory language,18 The court reasoned by analogy to the audio ex-
emption that Congress also intended to exclude home use videotape re-
cording from copyright protection. 9
The Sony court's holding that a home use exemption exists is signifi-
cant for two reasons. The decision represents the first express holding
that a home use sound recording exception exists40 and, more impor-
tantly, that Congress intended a general home use recording exception,
encompassing home videotaping. 41 The court found support for a home
use audio recording exception from the legislative history to the 1971
Sound Recording Amendment,42 , which indicated that Congress did not
intend to restrain such recording when motivated by private rather than
construing federal Act); United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44
(1940) (aid to statutory construction may be used no matter how clear words initially ap-
pear). The Sony court noted that Congress did not always draft statutory language to reflect
congressional intent. 480 F. Supp. at 443.
480 F. Supp. at 443-46. Although no court has held an individual liable for copyright
infringement on the basis of home use audio recording, the Sony decision is the first case to
state expressly that a home use audio recording exception exists. Accord, Home Use, supra
note 6, at 481. Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), has been the subject of considerable discussion in the context of a home use audio
exception. In Elektra, the defendants loaned copyrighted sound recordings to customers
purchasing blank eight-track tapes. The customers then used the high speed, coin operated
"Make-A-Tape" machines in defendants' stores to reproduce the recordings onto the newly
purchased blank tapes. Holding the defendants liable for copyright infringement, the Elek-
tra court rejected defendants' argument that the individual and self service nature of the
Make-A-Tape duplication was analogous to home recording. The court found such an inter-
pretation unimaginable. Id. at 824-25. At least two commentators view Elektra as affirma-
tively establishing judicial precedent for a home ,use audio recording exception. See Com-
ment, Betamax and Infringement of Television Copyright, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1181, 1207-08
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Betamax] (Elektra court implicitly recognized home use excep-
tion by arguing why exception should not apply to Elektra facts); Comment, Copyright Im-
plications Attendant Upon the Use of Home Videotape Recorders, 13 U. RICH. L. REv. 279,
292-93 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Copyright Implications] (Elektra court recognized ex-
ception for home audio recording but found exception inapplicable). See also Home Use,
supra note 6, at 481 n.74 (Elektra impliedly recognized home recording exception based on
House Committee Reports); comment, Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 600-01 (citing
congressional acceptance of home audiotaping); Comment, Betamax and Copyright: The
Home Videorecording Controversy, 1 WHrrrI.R L. REV. 229, 248 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Betamax and Copyright] (Elektra dicta implied judicially recognized home recording
exemption).
3, 480 F. Supp. at 447.
40 See Home Use, supra note 6, at 481.
41 480 F. Supp. at 446, 469.
42 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1(b), 85 Stat. 391 (superseded by 1976
Act); see 480 F. Supp. at 443-46 (discussion of legislative history to 1971 Sound Recording
Amendment); Betamax, supra note 37, at 1203-06; Home Use, supra note 6, at 483; Copy-
right Implications, supra note 37, at 290-92; Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 600-01;
Betamax and Copyright, supra note 38, at 247-49.
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commercial purposes. 43 Although neither the wording nor the legislative
history of the 1976 Act suggests a home'use audio exemptiom, the Sony
court reasoned that the 1971 Amendment and corresponding legislative
history were not altered by promulgation of the 1976 Act.4 4 Thus, the
court interpreted recent legislative silence to mean that Congress still in-
tended to allow a home audio recording exception.
4 5
The most significant aspect of the Sony decision is the court's finding
that Congress intended a general home use recording exemption, which
encompasses home use videotaping, from copyright coverage.4" The ques-
tion of a general home use exception has been widely discussed,7 yet
Sony is the first case to rule that such an'. exception exists. The court
formulated its holding by making an analogy to the home use sound re-
cording exception" and examining congressional committee hearings,'
49
floor debates,50 and a report from the Library of Congress' Office of Copy-
43 H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971), reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1566, 1572. The 1971 Sound Recording Amendment originally was part
of the general revision to the copyright law which Congress begari drafting in 1955 and
eventually passed in 1976. See 480 F. Supp. at 443.
44 In order to meet the growing problem of record piracy, Congress passed the Sound
Recording Act in 1971 rather than waiting for completion of the entire Copyright Act revi-
sion. Id. at 443-44. In 1976, Congress incorporated the language of the 1971 Amendment
into the New Act with virtually no changes. See S. REP. No. 72, 92d C6ng., 1st Sess. 7-8
(1971) (1971 Sound Recording Amendment to be merged into General Revision upon pas-
sage of General Revision); 480 F. Supp. at 444.
5 480 F. Supp. at 444-45. Any interpretation of legislative silence is highly speculative
by nature, see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 577 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) and
commentators have reached varying conclusions as to whether Congress intended to cariy
forward any home use audio recording exemption into the 1976 Copyright Act. Cf. Betamac,'
supra note 38, at 1217 (home use exemption of 1971 Sound Recording Act also applicable to
1976 Act); Home Use, supra note 6, at 484 (absence of specific legislative history discuisiig
home use sound recording exemption might indicate congressional intent to withdraw from
earlier position favoring exemption); Betamax and Copyright, supra note'37, at 249 '(diffi-
cult to infer affirmative conclusions from legislative failure to act).
46 480 F. Supp. at 446, 469.
47 See, e.g., Betamax, supra note 38, at 1208-18; Home Use, supra note'6, at 480-85;
Copyright Implications, supra note 37, at 290-94; Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at
600-01; Betamax and Copyright, supra note 38, at 245-50.
41 480 F. Supp. at 444-45.
9" Id. During the legislative hearings on the 1971 Sound Recording Act, a memler 'f
the House of 'Representatives asked the Assistant Register of Copyrights whether tape re-
cording a record was permissible under the proposed Act: The Assistant Register of Copy-
rights answered in the affirmative and went on to state that use of home videocassette re-
corders presents a similar question. The Assistant Register concluded that, like home audio
recording, the activity could not be controlled. Hearings on S. 646 Before the Subcomm. No.
3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971)(statement of Barbara
Ringer).
'o 480 F. Supp. at 445-46. The 1971 Sound Recording Act protects material duplicated
for commercial purposes only. The Act would not prohibit off-the-air recording for personal
pleasure of radio or television programs since such activity is considered .fair use. See 117
CONG. REc. 34, 748 (1971).
1980] 1 83
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rights.51 The Register of Copyrights issued a report in 1961 urging that
private performance of a copyrighted motion picture should not be an
infringement of copyright.52 The report directly addressed home use
videotape recording, stating that "new technical devices will probably
make it possible in the future to reproduce televised motion pictures in
the home. We do not believe that private use of such a reproduction can
or should be precluded by copyright.
'5 3
At least one commentator has questioned the validity of a home use
analogy between videotape recording and sound recording.5 Supporters
of the analogy argue that the two activities are substantially identical and
that allowing a home use audio exception while viewing home use vide-
otaping as infringement would be inconsistent. 55 Persons questioning the
analogy contend that although the activities may be similar, the financial
-harm to the copyright owner is not.56 The argument continues that a per-
son who has recorded a song off-the-air or from a phonorecord or tape
and later hears the song on the radio will still listen.57 When, however, a
movie or television show which the viewer has previously taped is re-
leased at theaters or rerun on television, some commentators claim that
the copyright owner will lose box office or advertising revenues as a re-
61 480 F. Supp. at 446. The Sony court observed that congressional hearings, floor de-
bates, and reports are each relevant to a determination of legislative intent. Id. at 445 (cit-
ing Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978)(statements by committee chairman and
bill sponsors entitled to great weight); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969)(departmental
construction of own enabling legislation carries more weight when department administra-
tors participated in drafting and expressed views to Congress in committee hearings); First
Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1966) (statements
of committee members may be considered); Ideal Farms, Inc. v. Benson, 288 F.2d 608, 616
(3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963) (comments by bill's sponsor during floor
debate may be considered)).
51 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN-
ERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (House Comm. Print
1961).
63 Id.
" See Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 601; text accompanying notes 56-58
infra.
1 See, e.g., Copyright Implications, supra note 38, at 293 (if home use sound recording
exemption allowed, similar exemption for videorecording justified); Betamax and Copyright,
supra note 38, at 248, 256 (no distinction in principal between unauthorized recording from
radio or from television receivers; home audiotaping exemption easily could be broadened to
cover home use videorecording). A major similarity between the practices of home videotap-
ing and home audiotaping is that enforcement of a prohibition against either would be vir-
tually impossible. 480 F. Supp. at 468; see Holland, The Audiovisual Package: Handle With
Care, 22 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'v, 104, 126 (1974); Meyer, TV Cassettes-A New Frontier
For Pioneers and Pirates, 19 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 16, 38 (1971); Copyright Implications,
supra note 38, at 294; Betamax and Copyright, supra note 38, at 248-49.
" See, e.g., Home Use, supra note 6, at 484; Copyright Implications, supra note 38, at
293; Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 601.
" See, e.g., Home Use, supra note 6, at 484; Copyright Implications, supra note 38, at
293; Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 601.
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sult.58 Upon closer analysis, however, one might question whether rerun
losses due to home videotaping are any more damaging to copyright own-
ers than losses to pre-recorded tape or record sales due to home
audiotaping.
In addition to finding a general home use recording exception which
would protect private Betamax use, the Sony court found home use
Betamax recording to be fair use59 as initially developed under the 1909
Act and codified, unaltered in the 1976 Act.60 The 1976 Act addresses fair
use in section 107,61 noting that unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted
works for such purposes as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research is not infringement 6 2 Section 107 states that four
factors to be considered in determining fair use shall include:
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.63
The Sony court stated that the four factors are not the exclusive con-
siderations relevant to a fair use determination and that fair use does not
" See, e.g., Home Use, supra note 6, at 484; Copyright Implications, supra note 38, at
293; see note 27 supra. Commenting on the analogy between home use audio and videotape
recording, one observer has noted that the statutory difference in definitions between the
two might have important consequences. Betamax, supra note 38, at 1217. The copyright
law classifies audiovisual recordings with motion pictures rather than phonorecords. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1979). Section 101 defines phonorecords as material objects in which
sounds, perceivable directly or with a machine (other than sound accompanying an audiovi-
sual work) are fixed. Thus, an audiovisual tape is by definition a motion picture while an
audiotape is a phonorecord. The commentator observed that the definition makes a differ-
ence, since the limitations on the exclusive rights of copyrighted motion pictures are much
less substantial than those on sound recordings. Betamax, supra note 38, at 1217. Compare
17 U.S.C. § 102(6) (Supp. HI 1979) (motion pictures) with id. § 102(7) (sound recordings).
5* The fair use exception allows reasonable use of a copyrighted work without the con-
sent of the copyright owner. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966); see text accompanying notes 61-67 infra.
60 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. HI 1979) (codification of fair use doctrine); see 480 F. Supp.
at 442. The 1976 Act codified fair use without amending the doctrine, characterizing fair use
as noninfringement rather than excused infringement. Id. at 447; see text accompanying
note 61 infra.
6, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. H 1979).
62 Id. An important distinction between the fair use exception and a home use exemp-
tion to copyright liability is that the former must be balanced on the four factor scale of §
107. See text accompanying note 63 infra (text of § 107). A home use exemption, however,
could be of broader scope since the exemption would arise purely out of public policy con-
siderations and would not depend on the § 107 test. See Betamax and Copyright, supra
note 38, at 249.
63 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. II 1979).
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require that each factor support the use in question.6 4 Furthermore, sec-
tion 107 does not specify the relative importance of the factors and only
generally defines the scope of each.s 5 Fair use is a factual determination
to be made on a case-by-case basis and cannot be determined exclusively
by arbitrary rules or fixed criteria." The doctrine is an equitable device
for balancing the competing interests of encouraging creative work
through copyright protection and promoting broad public availability of
the arts.
6 7
The Sony court began the section 107 fair use analysis with an exami-
nation of the harm factor found in subsection four.6 s The court stated
that the issue of harm was important for deciding three questions:
whether a use is fair, whether an injunction is available, and the amount
of damages.69 While acknowledging that actual harm might not be essen-
tial to any of these determinations, the Sony court observed that without
a showing of actual harm, a ruling in plaintiffs' favor would be much more
difficult.
70
Plaintiffs argued that harm to their copyrights, in the form of
financial loss, was an immiment effect of Betamax usage, but admitted
that no actual harm had yet occorred.7 1 Plaintiffs also were unable to pre-
dict when the anticipated harm would occur or the number of Betamax
purchases which would trigger the harm.7 2 Recognizing that plaintiffs'
480 F. Supp. at 448.
' See 3 M. NIMMER, NiMmER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A](1980) [hereinafter cited as NIM-
MER]. The Sony court noted that the fair use doctrine grants tribunals necessary flexibility
in an era of rapid technological development. 480 F. Supp. at 447; see note 95 infra.
" See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978).
'7 480 F. Supp. at 447 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1974)). Despite the policy of encouraging creative work, the primary concern of copy-
right law is public benefit rather than benefit to the individual author. 480 F. Supp. at 447
(citing H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909)).
" 480 F. Supp. at 450. As the Sony court noted, several commentators have suggested
that courts should consider the harm factor first when determining fair use. Id., see, e.g,. 3
NiMMER, supra note 65, at § 13.05[A][4]; L. SELTZER, ExEMPTIONS AND FAIR UsE IN COPY-
RIGHT at 36 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SELTZER]; Betamax, supra note 38, at 1209;
Betamax and Copyright, supra note 38, at 240-41 (citing SELTZER in observing that first
three factors of § 107 should be determine only after evaluating economic impact of record-
ing on copyright holder). One commentator has suggested that the fourth factor of economic
harm is a collection and restatement of the first three fair use factors found in § 107. Home
Use, supra note 6, at 476.
69 480 F. Supp. at 451. The preliminary test under the § 107(4) harm factor is whether
the copying materially tends to reduce the demand for the original work. Hill v. Whalen &
Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
70 480 F. Supp. at 451; cf. Fried, Fair Use and the New Act, 22 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 497,
505-07 (1977)[hereinafter cited as Fried] (advocating use of a "probable effects" test for
purposes of fair use harm analysis).
71 480 F. Supp. at 451.
72 Id. The Sony court observed that 1978 was Disney's eleventh consecutive year of
increased profit and the most profitable year in history for Universal Pictures' Theatrical
Division. Id. at 439. Emphasis on profitability may be misleading, however, when used to
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predictions were based on a rapidly 'changing market system and on a
great number of unsubstantiated assumptions, the trial court was hesi-
tant to identify any probable adverse effects from home use Betamax re-
cording.7 3 Additionally, the court reasoned that harm which merely limits
profits is considerably less likely to negate a fair use defense than harm
which threatens the existence of a copyrighted work.
74
The Sony court acknowledged that VTRs and other technological ad-
vances will change the television industry and introduce new factors into
plaintiffs' marketing considerations.7 5 Nevertheless, the court observed
that copyright law does not protect authors from changes or new consid-
erations in marketing their products.76 The trial court concluded that
even if the harm factor were decided in plaintiffs' favor, such a finding
would be inconclusive of a fair use determination since the other three
factors under section 107 must be balanced with the harm."
The Sony court next addressed the section 107(2) fair use factor con-
cerning the nature of the copyrighted material.7 8 Commenting on this fac-
tor, the Senate Report accompanying the 1976 Act observed that a major,
though not necessarily determinative consideration, is the work's availa
bility to the potential user.79 One commentator has noted in this regard
that television programming might be considered "unavailable" to those
evaluate harm to the copyright owner from an alleged infringing activity. The existence of
profits still may fail to reflect losses to the potential market for a copyrighted work. See
Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 612.
73 480 F. Supp. at 452. In projecting harm from Betamax use, plaintiffs predicted that a
large portion of the television households in the country would soon own the Betamax. Id.
at 451. Plaintiffs assumed that a large number of these owners would have the financial
ability and the desire to buy many blank tapes, costing approximately $20 each at the time
of trial. Id. Plaintiffs also anticipated that viewers would watch Betamax playbacks at a
time when they would otherwise watch live television. Id- Universal and Disney predicted
that even if Betamax owners did not keep their recorded tapes over a long period of time,
the owners would still injure plaintiffs' copyrights by deleting commercials'from the re-
corded material. Id. In addition, plaintiffs feared that Betamax recording would cause a
reduction in rerun audiences. Id. The Sony court noted plaintiffs' admission that some of
these assumptions were based on neither fact nor experience and were inconsistent and il-
logical. Id.
7" 480 F. Supp. at 452; see Fried, supra note 70, at 509 n.53; Betamax and Copyright,
supra note 38, at 288.
75 480 F. Supp. at 452; accord, Schuyten, supra note 10, at 3, col. 2 (video revolution
will relegate once-new technologies such as radio and television to status of mere prelude);
Business Week, supra note 15, at 60, col. 1 (television industry faces confusing future).
76 480 F. Supp. at 452 (citing Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 n.15
(1974)(freezing existing economic arrangements not purpose of Copyright Act)).
7 480 F. Supp. at 452. The Sony court's conclusion that resolution of the § 107(4) harm
factor in plaintiffs' favor would be inconclusive of the fair use determination is somewhat
questionable. Under traditional fair use analysis, the other § 107 factors to be balanced with
the § 107(4) harm factor tend to weigh against a fair use defense when applied in the con-
text of home use videorecording. See text accompanying notes 103-09 infra; NIMMER, supra
note 65, § 13.05[4](harm factor is central and most important factor in fair use analysis).
78 480 F. Supp. at 452.
7' See NIMMER, supra note 65, § 13.05 [A] [2].
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who are unable to view the programming at the particular time of
broadcast.80
The trial court recognized that the plaintiffs' copyrighted material
which defendant Griffiths had videorecorded could not be characterized
as "scientific" or "educational." 8' The court reasoned, however, that the
most important aspect of plaintiffs' copyrighted material was that the
plaintiffs voluntarily chose to have the material broadcast over public air-
waves to individual homes free of charge.82 The result of this practice is
that the plaintiffs receive payment from the broadcasters rather than the
audience. The broadcasters are in turn compensated by advertisers who
use the drawing power of the copyrighted material to promote their prod-
ucts.8s Any payment by the television viewers for the privilege of watch-
ing the copyrighted material is simply the result of higher prices paid by
the general public for the advertised products.8 4 The Sony court reasoned
that since the copyright owners derive their revenues only indirectly from
the alleged infringers of the work, the harm resulting from Betamax re-
cording is more speculative than harm in other media.
8 5
The third fair use factor analyzed by the Sony court was purpose of
the use.88 Courts traditionally have applied the purpose factor to exempt
copyrighted material used for criticism, research, or other independent
work.87 Under one view, the fair use defense should not be available if the
defendants' works serve the same function as the original.8 8 The Sony
court agreed with plaintiffs' contention that there is no independent use
11 Copyright Implications, supra note 38, at 286.
8' 480 F. Supp. at 452; see Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (fair use traditionally applied to works in fields of science, law,
medicine, history, and biography). One commentator has stated that § 107(2) does not pre-
clude a fair use defense for programming other than traditional scientific or educational
material. Rather, the major question is whether entertainment programming should be
viewed as serving a sufficient public interest for fair use purposes. Betamax and Copyright,
supra note 38, at 237, 239. Courts thus should use a policy analysis, based on perceived
societal benefit, in determining the § 107(2) fair use factor. Id.
11 480 F. Supp. at 453.
83 Id.
See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 411-12 (1974). A common theme
in the copyright debate concerns charging users twice for a particular use of a copyrighted
work. See Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 629-30 n.250. Any decision requiring con-
sumers to pay for home videorecording would result in a double charge for home entertain-
ment, since consumers already pay higher prices for goods advertised on television. Id. at
629.
85 480 F. Supp. at 453; see Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 411-12 (pay-
ment process distinguishes copyright owner in television industry from most others); Home
Videorecording, supra note 4, at 609 ("nature of the copyrighted work" factor should not be
decisive of fair use defense).
88 480 F. Supp. at 453.
87 See, e.g., Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D. Conn.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976); Loew's Inc. v. CBS, 131 F.
Supp. 165, 175 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom., Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 356 U.S. 43 (1956).
NiMMFm, supra note 65, § 13.05[B].
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of the copyrighted material since, as with the original telecast, Betamax
owners use their recordings for entertainment purposes. s9 The trial court
reasoned, however, that independent use is 'not a prerequisite to fair
use.90 Instead, the court focused on the fact that the use of plaintiffs'
copyrighted works was noncommercial and in the home.9 1
The Sony court stated that although afinding of noncommercial use
will not automatically invoke the fair use exception, noncommercial use
does increase the likelihood that the exception will apply to a given activ-
ity.9 2 In addition, the trial court noted that the purpose of Betamax re-
cording is to increase access to the material plaintiffs chose to broad-
cast.93 The court found this increase consistent with the first amendment
policy of providing the fullest possible access to information through the
public airwaves.' The trial court reasoned that the factors of noncom-
mercial, in-home use, and increased access mitigated the fact that the
case at hand involved no independent or educational use of the plaintiffs'
copyrighted works."
Substantiality of the use was the fourth factor which the Sony court
discussed.96 Generally, the more substantial the taking from the copy-
righted work, the less likely that the fair use defense will be available to a
defendant.9 Many cases have held that the defense of fair use is never
available where the copying is virtually total.98 One commentator has ob-
served, however, that such cases all appear to have involved some distri-
bution of copies which caused real or potential economic harm to the cop-
89 480 F. Supp. at 453-54. The Sony court noted that Congress did not require indepen-
dent use when finding home use audio recording to be fair use. Id. at 453.
:0 Id. at 453.
1 Id. at 453-54; see text accompanying note 43 infra (noting congressional distinction
between commercial and private use).
:2 480 F. Supp. at 453; see Loew's Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 131 F. Supp. at 175.
3 480 F. Supp. at 454; see note 151 infra (discussing "time-shifting" Betamax
capability).
480 F. Supp. at 454; see CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102
(1973)(first amendment policy favors providing fullest possible access to information
through public airwaves).
"5 480 F. Supp. at 453-54. As stated in the House Report accompanying 17 U.S.C. § 107
(Supp. III 1979), there was no congressional intent to freeze the doctrine of fair use through
codification, particularly in light of rapid technological change. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976).
"6 480 F. Supp. at 454.
7 Id.
93 See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 481 F.2d 751, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied sub nom O'Niell v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132, (1979) (interpretiang fair use
standards in parody context and interpreting Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.
1956), aff'd per curiam, 356 U.S. 43 (1958), as setting threshold that eliminates fair use
defense where copying is "virtually complete or almost verbatim"); Rosemont Enterprises,
Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966) Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777,
780 (8th Cir. 1962); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937); Walt
Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397, 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); NIMMER,
supra note 65, § 13.05[D][1]; Betamax and Copyright, supra note 38, at 239 (under tradi-
tional view, copying entire work precludes application of fair use defense).
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yright owner." The Sony court found the substantiality factor to be
closely related to the issue of harm, since the market effect of the infring-
ing copy will normally depend on whether the copy can substitute for the
original.100 While acknowledging that home use Betamax recording usu-
ally involves copying the entire work, the court stated that this fact would
not defeat the fair use defense since all factors must be taken together. 10 1
Thus, the court broke with traditional analysis by refusing to adopt a
threshold substantiality test barring the fair use defense in cases of near-
total copying. 0 2
Some commentators, anticipating the Sony decision, have concluded
that a traditional or literal analysis of the section 107 four factor test
would preclude application of the fair use exception to home use Betamax
recording. 03 Viewing the example provided by section 107(1),104 these ob-
servers note that despite the noncommercial nature of home use record-
ing, the purpose and character of such recording generally is not educa-
'9 Beltamax and Copyright, supra note 38, at 240.
00 480 F. Supp. at 454.
01 Id.; see Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 608. Over-rigid application of the
substantiality factor would severely limit dissemination of new technologies. The substanti-
ality criterion should block fair use finding only where the defendant markets a copy in
competition with the copyrighted work. Id.
102 480 F. Supp. at 455-56. Prior to the Sony decision, the only case abandoning the
traditional view that copying an entire copyrighted work could not be fair use was Williams
& Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 420 U.S. 376
(1975). The Williams & Wilkins court characterized the traditional view as an unwarranted
and overbroad generalization. Id. at 1353. The Court of Claims held that the wholesale pho-
tocopying of entire articles from plaintiff's medical journals by the National Institute of
Health (NIH) and the National Library of Medicine (NLM) constituted fair use under the
1909 Act. Id. at 1363. The NIH operated a medical research library and provided photo-
copies at no charge to the NIH research personnel. The NLM made hundreds of thousands
of copies each year while generally relying on only one or two subscriptions to a given jour-
nal. The library distributed these copies to users upon request. Id. at 1348. In finding this
copying to be fair use the court observed that the use was nonprofit in nature and that the
copyrighted works in question were scientific in nature and warranted special access by re-
searchers. Id. at 1354. The Williams & Wilkins court reasoned that the photocopying ena-
bled access to articles at minimal cost and that impeding such access by a finding of in-
fringement would injure medical research. Id. at 1357. Williams & Wilkins has been the
subject of considerable discussion. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 65, § 13.05[E][1]-[4]; Gold-
stein, Private Consumption of Public Goods: A Comment on Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States. 21 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 204 (1973);. Nimmer, Photocopying and Record
Piracy: Of Dred Scott and Alice in Wonderland, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1052 (1975); Com-
ment, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States: Library Photocopying of Copyrighted
Materials, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 127. The Court of Claims' decision in Williams & Wilkins has
received substantial criticism, particularly in regard to its treatment of the harm issue. See
NiMMER, supra note 65, § 13.05[E] (charging that court confused issues of damages and
liability). Professor Nimmer has noted, however, that it is by no means clear whether the
rule in Williams & Wilkins is limited to works which are scientific in nature, or whether the
public interest in access to information should be viewed as less important outside the sci-
entific area. Id. § 13.05[E][4][C].
103 Betamax, supra note 38, at 1209; Home Use, supra note 6, at 477.
104 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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tional.10 5 Rather, Betamax owners usually record for entertainment
purposes. 10 6 If one accepts the argument that home copying reduces the
rerun market, then the second factor, nature of the work, weighs against a
fair use finding since the nature of the plaintiffs' copyrighted works is
such that. profitability depends on successful rerun capabilities. 10 7 Tradi-
tional application of the third factor, amount and substantiality of the
portion used, would weigh even heavier against home use videotape re-
cording since the use generally involves the entire copyrighted work.10 8
Use of the threshold substantiality test, avoided by the Sony court,
clearly would prohibit such videotaping. Finally, if the analyst should
conclude that home use Betamax recording diminishes the potential mar-
ket for or value of the copyrighted work,109 then the fourth factor, eco-
nomic harm, would not support a fair use determination.
When viewed from another perspective, however, the Sony court made
a commendable effort to re-evaluate the traditional fair use analysis in
light of a problem which neither the courts nor Congress had heretofore
considered. One observer has noted that the traditional fair use analysis
is incomplete and archaic when applied to home use videotape record-
ing.110 Both the House and Senate reports accompanying the 1976 Act
state an intent to avoid freezing the fair use doctrine, given the state of
rapid technological development.1 1 Many, if not most commentators who
have addressed the issue have concluded that the fair use exemption, in
either the traditional or an updated form, should encompass home use
videotaping. 1 2 Each of these commentators, 3 like the Sony court,1 4 has
recognized that a finding of infringement would generate seemingly insur-
mountable enforcement problems.
After ruling that home use Betamax recording does not violate copy-
right law, the trial court also held that the fair use doctrine extended to
demonstration recording by the retail defendants.1 5 The Sony court rea-
soned that such use does not compete with plaintiffs' products and does
not involve the taping of entire shows.1 The court also observed that the
10' Betamax, supra note 38, at 1209; Home Use, supra note 6, at 476.
106 See Agostinb, supra note 3, at 62 (majority of programs recorded are regular TV
series; second most common recording is of movies).
107 See Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 580 (copyright owners depend on rerun
market for substantial portion of overall profits).
108 Copyright Implications, supra note 38, at 289.
109 See notes 151-52 infra (discussing plaintiffs' contentions regarding harm as result of
Betamax recording).
11 Copyright Implications, supra note 38, at 289.
"I H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5680; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975).
"I See, e.g., Betamax, supra note 38, at 1218; Copyright Implications, supra note 38,
at 289.
Betamax, supra note 38, at 1192; Copyright Implications, supra note 38, at 294.
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evidence failed to indicate any librarying' 17 by the retail stores of re-
corded Betamax tapes or any intent to use or profit from the copyrighted
works.118 Universal admitted at trial that demonstration copying had
caused no harm to the company's copyright in the materials recorded. 1 9
Furthermore, the company predicted no future harm from the copying
itself.120 Rather, the plaintiffs feared that demonstration copying led cus-
tomers to believe that off-the-air recording of copyrighted materials was
acceptable.1 21 The court easily disposed of this argument, however, on the
basis of its holding that such recording was, in fact, acceptable.
1 22
The third issue addressed by the Sony court was liability of the corpo-
rate defendants, Sony, Sonam, DDBI, and the retail stores, for home use
recording by individual Betamax owners.'23 The plaintiffs asserted that
the corporate defendants were liable on the basis of three theories: direct,
contributory, and vicarious liability."2 The court's ruling that home use
Betamax recording is not copyright infringement was dispositive of the
corporate liability issue, since each of plaintiffs' theories was premised on
a conclusion that home VTR use violates copyright law. The trial court
went further, however, and decided that even if home use copying were
infringement, the corporate defendants would not be directly, contribu-
torily, or vicariously liable."25
Plaintiffs first argued that the corporate defendants were direct in-
fringers because the defendants furnished the instrumentality for the al-
legedly infringing activity and because they knew and expected that the
major use of Betamax would be the recording of copyrighted material. 26
The trial court recognized that actual participation in the infringing ac-
tivity is not a prerequisite for direct infringement."1 The court reasoned,
however, that cases finding direct liability under such circumstances in-
volved a much more substantial and direct connection with the infringe-
:1 "Librarying" is the storing of VTR tapes for repeated future viewings. Id. at 465.




122 Id. The Sony court stated that, in any event, any indication of acceptability given
by the retail defendants was insufficient to render demonstration copying unfair. Id.
123 Id. One commentator has observed that fashioning an adequate remedy for home
videorecording might be impossible unless VTR manufacturers are also held liable, given
the problem of civil prosecution where such large numbers of people are involved. Home
Videorecording, supra note 4, at 605.
124 480 F. Supp. at 457.
125 Id.
126 Id. To support the contention that the corporate defendants fulfilled the require-
ments for direct infringement, plaintiffs relied on testimony of Sonam executives as well as
DDBI memos and advertisements. Plaintiffs claimed that this evidence showed that the
coprorate defendants expected and encouraged Betamax purchasers to record copyrighted
material. Plaintiffs also emphasized that DDBI was aware of the potential for copyright
infringement and consequently sought an indemnity agreement from Sony. Id.
127 Id. at 458.
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ment than could be attributed to the corporate defendants in the present
case.125 While Sony and Sonana manufacture and market the Betamax
and blank cassette tapes, they do not supply the copyrighted work to be
recorded.129 Furthermore, even if home videorecording of copyrighted
works were infringement, the sale of Betamax units and blank tapes eas-
ily could lead to noninfringing uses. s3 Such uses include taping non-copy-
righted works, taping copyrighted works with permission from the copy-
right owner, playing prerecorded tapes,13 1 or making home movies with
Betamax' optional video camera attachment.132 The court found no prece-
dent for extending liability for direct infringement under such
circumstances. 33
Liability under the second theory, contributory infringement, requires
that the defendant have knowledge of and materially contribute to the
infringing activity.13 The court found neither of these elements present
in the Sony case.13 5 The corporate defendants did not have the requisite
knowledge because before the Sony decision, the issue of infringement
through home use VTR recording was undetermined.,3 " In addition, the
court found the material contribution element lacking since there was no
evidence to indicate that Betamax advertisements encouraged any of the
Betamax owners testifying as witnesses to reproduce copyrighted
works.
1 3 7
128 Id; see Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911); Elektra Records Co. v. Gen-
eral Elec. Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). In Kalem, the Supreme Court
affirmed a finding of copyright infringement against a film producer on the basis of public
exhibition of an infringing film by third persons. The defendant had both produced and
advertised the film which contained scenes from a copyrighted book. 222 U.S. at 61, 63.
11 480 F. Supp. at 458.
23o Id.
13 480 F. Supp. at 465; see Agostino, supra, note 3, at 51. A recently released vide-
oprogramming catalogue contains over 16,000 entires, including three to four thousand rep-
resenting movies and entertainment. Nine of the ten major movie producers now have for-
mal arrangements for distribution of films on prerecorded videocassettes. Id.
32 See Agostino, supra note 3, at 16.
33 480 F. Supp. at 459.
1 See Gershwin. Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971). Plaintiffs alleged that unauthorized recording of copyrighted motion pictures
is the primary purpose for which the Betamax is designed and marketed and which defen-
dants encourage through advertisements and brochures. 480 F. Supp. at 459.
135 480 F. Supp. at 459-60.
13 Id. at 460. The Sony court reasoned that even if the proability that Betamax owners
would record copyrighted works was sufficient to create constructive knowledge of such re-
cording by the defendants, these defendants could not have known that the recording was
an infringing activity. Id. Thus, the court stated that even if home use recording had been
found to be infringement, the court would not attribute retroactive knowledge of that fact to
the defendants. Id.
137 Id. A better organized case by the Sony plaintiffs might have yielded a different
result on the material contribution issue. Many national ads for the Betamax have en-
couraged the public to record "novels for television" and "classic movies." Id. at 436. Had
plaintiffs engaged in more diligent witness selection they might have produced testimony
indicating that Betamax advertisements did provide the incentive to record copyrighted
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The basis of vicarious liability is in the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior, under which an employer is liable for the actions of his employees.
138
Nevertheless, vicarious liability for copyright infringement does not re-
quire an employer-employee relationship. 39 To meet the requirements for
vicarious liability, a defendant must have the right and ability to super-
vise the infringing activity and a direct financial interest in the prac-
tice. "1 0 The Sony court found the supervision element absent,'4 ' since the
defendants would practically have to stop selling Betamax units in order
to control the recording of copyrighted material."42 The court also ques-
programs.
The Sony court observed that selling a staple article of commerce such as a typewriter,
camera, or photocopying machine technically contributes to any subsequent infringing use
made thereof. 480 F. Supp. at 461; see Home Use, supra note 6, at 478 n.58 (noting analogy
to photocopying industry); Betamax and Copyright, supra note 38, at 254. The court rea-
soned, however, that a decision making the sale of a staple article of commerce a sufficient
basis for contributory liability would expand the theory beyond judicial management. 480 F.
Supp. at 461. The trial court alluded to the patent law rule which protects manufacturers of
staple items of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use from liability of contrib-
utory infringers. Id. The court found the underlying rationale for the patent law rule signifi-
cant as a means to avoid any impediment to commerce. Id.
138 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971). In a case decided prior to Gershwin, the Second Circuit found a chain store
operator liable for the sale of infringing record albums by a concessionaire within the defen-
dant's store. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963).
The Shapiro court discussed both "vicarious liability" and respondeat superior in the con-
text of copyright infringement. The court observed that the store owner retained the ulti-
mate right of supervision over the record concession and received a proportionate share of
the sale of the infringing records. Id. at 308. There is an important distinction, however,
between the retailer in Shapiro and the corporate defendants in the Sony case. The Shapiro
retailer sold an item which was itself infringing. The Sony Betamax, however, is simply an
article of commerce capable of noninfringing as well as infringing uses. While defendant
Green in the Shapiro case served as a direct link in the distribution of pirated products, the
Betamax user and not the manufacturer controls the extent of any "infringing" use of the
product. See Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 604.
139 480 F. Supp. at 461.
140 Id.; see Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d at
1162; accord, Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399,
402 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In Chess Music Co. v. Sipe, 442 F. Supp. 1184, 1185 (D. Minn. 1977),
the Minnesota district court held a tavern owner vicariously liable for the infringing per-
formance of live bands he hired. The court found the owner to have acquiesced in the in-
fringing activity since he gave the musicians the discretion to select the music performed.
Id. at 1185.
41 480 F. Supp. at 462; accord, Betamax and Copyright, supra note 38, at 253.
141 480 F. Supp. at 462. The Sony court found no authority which indicated that a
defendant's power to supervise the allegedly infringing activity was based on the ability to
terminate the business. Id. Plaintiffs suggested that the defendants could invent a "jamming
system" to prevent recording of copyrighted telecasts. Id. The court responded that the
plaintiffs' suggestion would not be within the defendants' power since development of a
jamming system would probably require the cooperation of many others beyond the defen-
dants' control, including broadcasters, producers, and the FCC. Id. Plaintiffs also asserted
that the defendants could modify the Betamax by removing the tuner and therefore make
any off-the-air recording impossible. Id. The court dismissed this argument as well, observ-
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tioned whether the defendants met the financial benefit test, noting that
the defendants benefit directly from the infringing use only if they sell
more products because that use is available. 143 This assumption certainly
appears valid,14 4 however, given recent survey data which indicate that
eighty percent of off-the-air VTR recording is of copyrighted material.
14 5
After ruling that the corporate defendants were not liable for any in-
fringing home use of Betamax, the Sony court denied the requested in-
junctive relief.14s The court went a step further than was necessary, how-
ever, and stated that even if home use Betamax recording were
infringement and the corporate defendants were secondarily liable, an in-
junction would be improper. 47 The trial court acknowledged that actual
harm from copyright infringement is very difficult to prove and that in
the ordinary case, courts will presume the irreparable harm necessary for
an injunction once infringement is shown."4 The court reasoned, how-
ever, that the equitable considerations were different from those in the
ordinary copyright infringement case, since plaintiffs were not seeking an
injunction against a direct infringer or the party controlling the infringing
activity. 49 Thus, the court concluded that a harm analysis was necessary
ing that consumers could still purchase a tuner separately and accomplish the same result.
Id.
One commentator viewed manufacturers as powerless to prevent misuse of their prod-
ucts, given the inability to police each purchaser's intent. Home Videorecording, supra note
4, at 605. The commentator reasoned that imposing such liability could indicate that manu-
facturers were liable solely because the infringement might not have occurred without their
facilities. Id. at 605-06. The author concluded that judicial precedent indicates infringement
does not extend that far. Id. (citing Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977) (cbrporate
officer with no control over infringing activity held not liable; insufficient to argue that cor-
porate officer must have controlled infringing activity by virtue of position as officer)).
143 480 F. Supp. at 462.
144 Accord, Betamax and Copyright, supra note 38, at 253 (finding financial benefit
element present).
145 See Agostino, supra note 3, at 66.
1" 480 F. Supp. at 468-69. Plaintiffs asked for an injunction restraining defendants
from manufacturing or selling the Betamax or blank Betamax tapes and from advertising
that purchasers may use these products to record copyrighted materials off-the-air. Id. at
463. Universal and Disney also suggested that the injunction prohibit the playing of all vide-
otapes which the individual and retail defendants recorded of plaintiffs' copyrighted motion
pictures or television shows. Id. Alternatively, plaintiffs petitioned that the court require
Sony to modify the Betamax so as to be incapable of recording copyrighted works off-the-
air. Id.; see note 142 supra.
147 480 F. Supp. at 464.
148 Id.; see American Metropolitan Enterprises of New York, Inc. v. Warner Bros.
Records, Inc., 389 F.2d 903, 905 (-d Cir. 1968).
14, 480 F. Supp. at 464. The Sony court noted plaintiffs' citations in support of the
assertion that no court had ever refused to grant an injunction once infringement had been
proven. Id. (citing Chappell & Co. v. Middletown Farmers Market & Auction Co., 334 F.2d
303 (3d Cir. 1964) (direct infringer permanently enjoined); Big Sky Music v. Todd, 388 F.
Supp. 498 (S.D. Ga. 1974)(injunction against owner and operator of nightclub for copyright
infringement by live bands performing in the club); Fisher-Price Toys v. My-Toy Co., Inc.,
385 F. Supp. 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)(direct infringer permanently enjoined); Shapiro, Bernstein
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since the corporate defendants' role in the infringement was indirect and
since Betamax is also capable of non-infringing uses.'50 Plaintiffs claimed
that they would suffer loss to the value of their copyrights as a result of
home use Betamax recording.' 5 ' After a detailed analysis, however, the
trial court dismissed plaintiffs' fears of future harm as groundless in light
of available evidence.
2
& Co., Inc. v. "Log Cabin Club Association," 365 F. Supp. 325, 328 (N.D. W. Va. 1973)(in-
junction against president and manager of association for musical copyright infringements
occurring in club operated by association); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp.,
188 F. Supp. 235, 238-(S.D.N.Y. 1960)(direct infringer permanently enjoined); Adviser's Inc.
v. Wiesen-Hart, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 831 (S.D. Ohio 1958) (direct infringer permanently en-
joined); Gordon v. Weir, 111 F. Supp. 117, 124 (E.D. Mich. 1953), afi'd, 216 F.2d 508 (6th
Cir. 1954) (direct infringer permanently enjoined)). Given the court's arguendo assumption
that home use Betamax recording was infringement and that the corporate defendants could
be held liable for the infringement, the decision contains some logical flaws which bear men-
tioning. First, under the court's assumption, the equitable considerations of the case would
not, as the court stated, be different from the ordinary copyright infringement case since the
case at hand could involve a direct infringer or party controlling the infringing activity. The
Sony court's professed inability to locate a case finding liability on the part of the manufac-
turers, distributors, retailers, or advertiser of the instrument enabling the infringement also
exhibits flawed reasoning. If the court followed its own hypothetical, such defendants would
by definition be liable as direct, contributory, or vicarious infringers and the above-cited
cases granting injunctions would appear controlling. But cf. text accompanying notes 150-54
infra (additional considerations relevant in denying injunction).
110 480 F.2d at 465.
211 Plaintiffs predicted harm to the value of their copyrights from three Betamax uses.
The first is known as time-shifting, which involves recording off-the-air while, not watching
the program, viewing the copy within a short period of time, and shortly thereafter, erasing
the copy. Id. at 465. The Betamax is capable of recording material from one channel while
the television is tuned to another channel. Some models offer a timing device which allows
off-the-air taping while the viewer is absent. Id. at 435. In this manner, Betamax time-
shifting capability increases the viewer's access to broadcasts which he otherwise might have
missed. Plaintiffs secondly predicted harm from librarying, which involves the retention of
an off-the-air recording for repeated subsequent viewings. Id. at 465. Plaintiffs' third con-
cern with Betamax use stemmed from the home user's likelihood of avoiding commercials,
either through use of the pause button while recording or by fast forwarding during play-
back. Id.
'" 480 F. Supp. at 465-69. The Sony court considered four harms which plaintiffs pre-
dicted would result from time-shifting. First, plaintiffs feared that Betamax viewers would
not be measured by the ratings, resulting in decreased advertising revenue. Id. at 466. The
court responded that since the Nielsen Ratings had already developed the ability to measure
Betamax recording and subsequent playback, the plaintiffs' fears were groundless. Id. Since
the date of the Sony decision, both major rating services have begun to routinely measure
VTR use in their audience surveys. See Callahan, FCC Deplores Vidisk'Units' Incom-
patability, Billboard, Feb. 23, 1980, at 44, col. 3.
Plaintiffs' second fear from time-shifting was that live television and movie audiences
would decrease as more people watch Betamax tapes as an alternative. 480 F. Supp. at 466.
The court felt that an equally likely presumption was that Betamax owners would play their
tapes when there was nothing on television or at the movies which they wished to see. Id.
Plaintiffs relied on the concept that "viewing time is relatively inelastic" since people will
supposedly spend only a limited amount of time watching any kind of television, whether
pre-recorded tapes or live telecasts. Id. The court responded that even if this proposition
were true, time-shifting might simply rearrange these hours. Id.; cf. Agostino, supra note 3,
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In denying the plaintiffs' requests, the Sony court reasoned that an
injunction which sought to deprive the public of a new technology capa-
ble of non-infringing use would be an extremely harsh remedy, unprece-
dented in copyright law.18 3 The court further noted that enforcement of
an injunction against the Betamax would be nearly impossible and highly
intrusive, as the machines are in private homes.
11
The Sony court's lengthy opinion culminating in the denial of injunc-
tive relief seems to reflect the court's anticipation of an immediate ap-
peal. The court's dual findings of a home use exemption and a fair use
exception provide a wide basis for sanctioning home use videotaping. Fur-
ther, the trial court appears to have calculated its additional discussion of
the alternative premises of home use as copyright infringement and liabil-
at 66 (44% of VTR owners surveyed stated that they watch more television since purchasing
the machine, only 15% watch less); Business Week, supra note 15, at 61, col. 1 (NBC plan-
ning studies indicate that new video technologies will cause viewers to wafch more
television).
Plaintiffs' third concern over time-shifting was that the practice would reduce revenues
for rerun telecasts. 480 F. Supp. at 466. The court found this fear to be unfounded since the
larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price that the copyright holder
can demand from broadcasters for rerun rights. Id. Given that ratings reflect Betamax re-
cording, original audiences could only increase due to time-shifting, thus aiding the plain-
tiffs rather than harming them. Id.
Plaintiffs' fourth fear from time-shifting was that subsequent theater or film rental ex-
hibition would suffer because of time-shifting. Id. at 467. The court responded that since
time-shifting involves viewing and then erasing, the program would no longer be on tape
when the later theatrical run begins. Id. The court also observed that no evidence suggested
that public interest in later theatrical exhibitions would be reduced any more by Betamax
recording than by television broadcast of the film. Id.
Plaintiffs' major fear from the practice of librarying was that the Betamax owner who
has kept a copy of a program will not watch the same program when rerun on television or
re-released for theater exhibition. Id. The Sony Court found that the plaintiffs' prediction
was based on too many unsubstantiated presumptions to warrant an injunction. Id. The
court reasoned that blank tape prices of approximately $20 each would make extensive li-
brary building very expensive. The trial court concluded that even if theater audiences did
decrease, the decrease would be offset by the corresponding increase in audience size for the
original telecast. Id. at 468. The court also noted that theater-going is usually a social event
which affords a larger viewing screen, better sound, and an unedited version of the film. Id.
Plaintiffs' final fear from Betamax use concerned the potential that home users would
avoid advertisements. Id. Plaintiffs speculated that advertisers would react adversely to
Betamax. Id. Universal and Disney argued that if Betamax owners use the pause button to
delete commercials or the fast-forward to bypass them, advertisers would pay less to the
networks and the networks would pay less to the copyright owners. Id. The court properly
responded, however, that Betamax owners must view the commercials in order to eliminate
them with the pause button. Id. To avoid commercials by fast-forwarding during playback,
the viewer must usually guess as to when the commercial has passed. Id. The trial court
noted that, according to survey results introduced at trial, 92% of Betarnax owners recorded
the commercials and only 25% of the owners fast-forwarded through them on playback. Id.
The court found no substantial likelihood of harm from the prospect of commercial avoid-
ance, stating that advertisers will have to make the same kinds of judgments they do now as
to whether persons watching television actually watch interrupting advertisements. Id.
253 480 F. Supp. at 468; accord, Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 625.
154 480 F. Supp. at 468; accord, Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 625.
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ity of the corporate defendants as a means to reinforce the denial of in-
junctive relief against attack on appeal.
The Sony court's finding of a general home use copyright exemption is
the most striking aspect of the decision, since no direct judicial precedent
existed for such a holding.' 5 While the court may have engaged in "judi-
cial legislation," the opinion makes a convincing argument based on legis-
lative history and a rational evaluation of the policies underlying copy-
right protection.8 There is strong support for judicial recognition of a
home audiotaping exemption and the better reasoned analysis would ap-
pear to favor extending this exemption to home videorecording by anal-
ogy.' 57 The fair use doctrine, now accepted by statute, was developed ju-
dicially on no more substantial a basis.
The trial court's additional holding that home use videorecording is
fair use represents a non-traditional analysis of the section 107 four factor
test.158 The court's approach is commendable in light of the equally novel
issue posed by a technology unknown during development of the fair use
doctrine.159 Furthermore, the Sony analysis is consistent with Congress'
intention to allow flexibility of the doctrine in light of technological
change.
1 60
Given the court's ruling that home use videorecording is not an in-
fringement of copyright, 61 the conclusion that the corporate defendants
were not liable'6 2 followed automatically. The trial court's secondary find-
ing of non-liability even if home Betamax recording were infringement
was a response to another issue of first impression. The court's response
appears to be valid, however, since the corporate defendants failed to
meet the requirements for direct, contributory, or vicarious liability.6 3
The Sony court's sanctioning of home use videorecording also dictated
the denial of injunctive relief. The secondary conclusion that an injunc-
tion would be improper, even assuming individual and corporate liability,
is the more questionable element of the opinion.2" Although the court's
reasoning is inconsistent at times,6 5 the basic emphasis on the absence of
155 See notes 46-58 infra.
'6 Accord, Betamax and Copyright, supra note 38, at 256 (precedent for judicial recog-
nition of home use exemption already exists in Elektra case and this exemption easily could
be broadened to cover home videorecording).
157 Id. Contra, Home Use, supra note 6, at 481 (only legislative history of 1971 Sound
Recording Act supports home use exemption and it is unlikely that courts would find such
an exception absent greater legislative mandate).
'" Compare notes 59-102 supra with notes 103-07 supra.
159 See Copyright Implications, supra note 38, at 280 (noting "Keystone Kops" appear-
ance of efforts to adopt copyright laws, not designed with 20th century technology in mind,
to new home video advances).
160 See note 95 infra.
:61 See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
362 See text accompanying notes 123-45 supra.
:63 See text accompanying notes 125-45 supra.
64 See text accompanying notes 147-54 supra.
165 See note 149 supra.
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harm, the indirect role of the corporate defendants in the alleged in-
fringement, and the impediment to a new technology capable of non-in-
fringing uses,168 is the correct approach.
When viewed as a whole, the Sony decision evinces a realistic evalua-
tion of the equities of the case in light of existing circumstances. Home
use of the Betamax and other videotape recorders is already wide-
spread.167 Enforcement of a ban on home videotaping would be difficult if
not impossible. Despite plaintiffs' fears, the new videotape technology is
likely to benefit rather than harm producers of audiovisual works by pro-
viding new channels of distribution for these works. 6 s In addition, since
national television ratings now reflect increased audience size due to
videotape recording, broadcasters can demand higher advertising rates for
copyrighted telecasts.169
As the Sony court states, the decision addresses only one part of the
home video controversy-home use recording from free television broad-
casts. Unresolved issues include videotaping from pay or cable television,
tape swapping, tape duplication, and off-the-air recording for classroom
or business purposes.1 7 0 Clearly, Congress should act quickly to provide
guidance for the rapidly expanding home video field 71 before potential
judicial conflict increases the confusion. In the meantime, courts should
be hesitant to take action limiting consumer access to new technologies.
The Sony court's straightforward decision is a commendable,17 2 initial
step towards resolution of the home video controversy.
173
JEFFREY H. GRAY
166 See text accompanying notes 153-54 supra.
167 See Lewin, Video Craze Signals New Legal Static, National Law Journal, Mar. 24,
1980, at 1, col. 4 (noting proliferation of viaeo magazines and newsletters; Billboard maga-
zine's "Top 40" videocassette listing).
168 See Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at 618 (VTR may enhance dissemination of
existing copyrighted works through pre-recorded tape software market).
16' See note 152 supra.
170 480 F. Supp. at 442.
171 Accord, Betamax and Copyright, supra note 38, at 256-57.
172 Accord, Betamax, supra note 38, at 1218; Home Videorecording, supra note 4, at
633; Copyright Implications, supra note 38, at 295; Betamax and Copyright, supra note 38,
at 256-57.
"I Plaintiffs in the Sony case have filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 79-3603.
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